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Abstract 
This article examines how notions of artistic truth and authenticity articulated 
by Konstantin Stanislavski and his followers might be adapted for use within 
interactive and immersive performance.  Making connections between 
Stanislavski’s aesthetics and the kinds of spectatorial relationships 
established within contemporary participatory performance, the article asserts 
that Stanislavskian techniques used for training actors to behave truthfully in 
imaginary circumstances can also be used productively when training for 
performances that reject the fourth wall conventionally associated with 
Stanislavskian theatre. 
The article draws on the author’s experience of practising and teaching 
techniques developed by Stanislavski, Lee Strasberg and Sanford Meisner, 
as well as his experiences of creating and performing within intimate, 
interactive performances.  The discussion of these practices is framed by a 
critical discussion of how issues in contemporary performance aesthetics 
relates to the field of performance training, making specific reference to 
Nicolas Bourriaud’s theory of relational aesthetics. 
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Introduction 
In this article, I will examine my own experiences of developing training for 
interactive and immersive performance, making specific reference to the 
application of techniques and exercises from the Stanislavskian tradition of 
acting.  At the centre of this discussion is a desire to communicate the results 
of practice-based research from my work as a theatre-maker.   However, in 
the process of considering my use of practices developed by Stanislavski and 
his followers, I have come to realise that some of the more significant (and 
unexpected) results of my research relate to the development of a way of 
thinking about the adaptation, appropriation and translation of historical 
knowledge from the field of performer training.  I believe these secondary 
results to be interesting because of their potential value to practitioners 
working outside the disciplinary boundaries of my performance practice.  It is, 
therefore, along two parallel tracks that I intend to proceed.  One path will 
focus on examining case-studies of training from my own practice. The other 
will concentrate on the broader methodological and contextual question of 
how approaches developed with specific, and historically contingent, aesthetic 
ends in mind might be adapted to function within very different kinds of 
contemporary practice.   I have organised the structure of this article in such a 
way that these micro and macro levels of analysis are left separate - speaking 
to each other from a position of contiguity rather than integration.  This choice 
has been made in order to leave interstices for the reader’s thinking.  It is my 
hope that readers will weave their own ideas and questions across the divide 
that separates the two parts of my argument.  
The Death of Performance Training 
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In her excellent book, The Death of Character, the critic Elinor Fuchs draws 
on the thinking of Jacques Derrida to argue that some of the most significant 
developments in dramatic form during the Twentieth Century emerged in 
relation to the perceived tension between the authenticity of the performing 
body’s corporeal presence and the predetermined, artifice of the text (1996, p. 
73).  In her analysis, Fuchs uses the recognition of the performer’s dialectical 
status as both spontaneous, authentic subject and predetermined, aesthetic 
object to think through the complexities involved in articulating the differences 
between character, actor and text.  Fuchs is not alone in noting that the 
innovations of many Twentieth Century theatre-makers were found in the 
process of interrogating this apparent space between body and text.  Her 
analysis echoes the work of Stanton Garner (1994) and Bert States (1987), 
both of whom brought phenomenological perspectives to bear on the work of 
modernist dramatists. It also connects to Alan Read’s account of theatre as a 
medium that plays on the boundaries separating ‘the natural’ and ‘the social’ 
(2009, p.15).  
I draw the reader’s attention to these critical examinations of modernist and 
post-modernist performance, because their analysis of theatre aesthetics can 
be understood to have repercussions within the field of performance training 
which I believe reverberate in ways that have yet to be analysed fully in 
discussions of contemporary performance-making.  If, as Fuchs suggests, 
contemporary theatre aesthetics can be seen to depend on the opposition 
between the performing body’s authenticity and the text’s artifice, it seems 
useful to analyse the potential role of performance training in mediating the 
complex aesthetic relationships between character, actor, text and meaning.   
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However, the process of mediating these relationships is more frequently 
discussed as an issue of dramaturgy.  To a certain extent, this is 
understandable.  If dominant critical perspectives suggest that the meaning of 
contemporary performance is realised in the opposition between the 
performer’s corporeal reality and the constructedness of the performance 
score or text, it makes sense to consider the performer’s body as a fixed 
quantity within the dramaturgical schema, rather than the subject of an 
aesthetic process of change and transformation.  And if the performer’s job is 
ultimately to be herself, carrying out predetermined tasks, while meaning is 
made through a process of creative juxtaposition that is completed in the 
spectator’s interpretation of events, it becomes apparent why issues of 
training have become subservient to issues of dramaturgy in the analysis of 
contemporary performance practice.   
This shift away from discussions of training can also be related to the ways in 
which the aesthetic tensions articulated by Fuchs have had an impact upon 
our sense of disciplinary boundaries in performance.  In aesthetic contexts 
where the performer is valued for the fact of her presence, the process of 
drawing consistent boundaries to separate and connect contemporary 
practices from the fields of live art, dance, theatre and performance is fraught 
with complexity.   In 1968, Peter Brook claimed that all that was needed for an 
act of theatre to be engaged was someone walking across an empty space 
while someone else watched (1990, p. 11).  In 2018, it seems pertinent to 
question whether the same event could also be recognised as an act of live 
art, dance or performance art.  The crosspollination of previously distinct 
artistic disciplines has become commonplace in post-millennial artistic 
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practice - to the extent that the blurring of form once associated with the 
experimental work discussed by Fuchs, Read, States and Garner is now 
commonplace in commercial and mainstream art.   This development has 
allowed for the evolution of a diverse and fascinating performance ecology; 
however, it also raises questions about how the contemporary performance 
practitioner negotiates her relationship to bodies of knowledge that were 
developed when disciplinary boundaries were more fixed.  It stands to reason 
that, if we cannot be sure of the distinctions that separate dance from 
performance art or theatre, the question of what should be contained within 
the performer’s training can no longer be answered with certainty – especially 
when considering performance contexts in which the performer’s role is 
indistinguishable from her self.  
Beyond the difficulty of establishing coherent definitions of the various formal 
disciplines associated with performance, I believe that prioritizing the 
performer’s reality as an embodied subject can itself be understood as a 
barrier to discussions of training.  In the run up to The Artist is Present, Marina 
Abramović’s 2010 exhibit at New York’s Museum of Modern Art, the artist was 
asked to articulate the difference between theatre and performance art.  She 
said: 
To be a performance artist, you have to hate theatre. Theatre is fake… 
The knife is not real, the blood is not real, and the emotions are not 
real. Performance is just the opposite: the knife is real, the blood is 
real, and the emotions are real. (in O’Hagan 2010) 
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It seems almost unnecessary to point out the naivety and (considering her 
professional association with Robert Wilson) possibly calculated nature of 
Abramović’s remarks.  Nevertheless, I do so in order to show how the 
uncritical use of arbitrary disciplinary boundaries can undermine discussions 
of training.   Abramović’s statement can be read as an attempt to frame the 
aesthetic preoccupations of a branch of art that is deeply concerned with the 
ways in which performance might be used to facilitate moments of authentic 
experience.  However, to define performance as rooted in reality, while 
placing it in strict opposition to the apparent artifice of theatre, is to limit 
discussion of the ways in which the aesthetics of both theatre and 
performance art manipulate and guide the spectator’s perception of the 
performing body’s status as a living subject for symbolic or narrative effect.  
While we should not, perhaps, spend too much time analysing remarks made 
to a journalist on a promotional junket, I think that Abramović’s use of 
problematic disciplinary binaries illustrates the ways in which critical 
discussions that highlight the performing body’s dialectical status as material 
reality and artificial construct tend to negate the impact of performance 
training when working outside the context of dramatic representation.  It would 
not be unreasonable to think that, because the body’s reality is a fact, training 
should only be required to achieve the fakeness Abramović associates with 
theatre.  However, while the performing body’s materiality may be an 
inescapable and creatively potent fact for the spectator, critic and dramaturg, 
this does not free the performer from the need to think about, and prepare for, 
the act of performance.   
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It is interesting to note that the act of training is hardly discussed in key texts 
on the aesthetics of contemporary performance (including the ones I have 
cited in this article).  Indeed, the Twentieth Century’s emphasis on 
juxtaposition over synthesis might even be read as the beginning of the end of 
performance training – a historical moment in which the importance of training 
is superseded by other activities associated with the performer’s shift in status 
from creative interpreter to author and subject.   However, even in contexts 
where the performer is valued primarily for her material presence, she is not 
experientially free from the ways in which theatrical space renders her 
presence and subjectivity into form.  With this fact in mind, it seems relevant 
to consider the ways in which critical shifts in performance aesthetics can be 
understood to recast the act of training, instead of prompting its negation.   
We can note, for example, that although Marina Abramović prioritizes the 
perceived reality of her actions, she has also written extensively about the 
process of preparing for her performances, often framing her lived experience 
as a form of preparation (Abramović  2014, 2016).  However, even after 
reading anecdotal accounts of training from across the fractured landscape of 
contemporary performance, it remains extremely difficult to anatomize the act 
of performance within the ostensive contexts of presentation associated with 
non-mimetic or non-narrative work.  Personal accounts of training cannot 
answer broad critical questions about what it means to train to be oneself in 
the act of performance.   They certainly cannot suggest generic skills for a 
world in which genres and disciplines are so ill defined. 
In order to circumvent the problem of only being able to discuss skill-
development in terms of its relationship to unique working practices, I believe 
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that we can benefit from analysing contemporary performance trainings not as 
processes of acquiring skills but as means of facilitating ontological 
engagement.  On one level, the discipline is primed for such a discussion. The 
previous century is littered by artist-gurus using art as a vehicle for self-
discovery. And yet, it is also the case that scholars working in the field of 
performance training have struggled with the question of its relevance to the 
broader field of studies in contemporary performance.  Analysis of training 
from the last hundred years has been marked by a focus on the specificity of 
its origins and authors.  Anyone who has taught the work of Brook, Grotowski, 
Chaikin or Lecoq within the academy will know the difficulty of answering the 
question of how such approaches can speak to the needs of young theatre 
makers with aspirations to work in diverse performance contexts.  However, 
through framing training as a mode of self-enquiry, as opposed to a means of 
collecting skills for, as yet, undefined projects, we can create space to revive 
the role of performance training within discussions of contemporary 
performance aesthetics.   
Perhaps ironically, it is through prioritizing questions about the performer’s 
self-experience during training that we might find ways of recognising the 
contributions and foresight of those icons of performance training that have 
recently spent time locked in back waters of performance history associated 
with the idiosyncratic, the old-fashioned and the strange.  Indeed, I believe 
that such a shift will allow us to recognise the ways in which the founders of 
training methodologies associated with self-inquiry were helping to shape the 
shifting tide of aesthetics analysed by Fuchs and others.  
Training to be Myself 
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I want to feel like myself in the act of performance.  No more.  No less.  When 
I am on stage I want to avoid feeling like I’m trying to be something that I am 
not.  This desire comes not from any particular aversion to theatricality or 
artifice, but from the pragmatic understanding that such self-consciousness 
tends to prevent me from connecting with the sense of shared presence that I 
value in live performance.  Although much of my work involves storytelling, I 
am most interested in theatre’s potential as a space for dialogue and 
empathetic engagement.  This interest has encouraged me to conceptualise 
my role on stage in my work as being closest to the presenter of a 
documentary or the host of a talk show.  Even when engaging in moments of 
autobiographical storytelling during a solo performance, I never think of myself 
as the subject of the piece.  Although I know that I am not neutral within the 
scheme of performance, I want to be seen by the audience as a facilitator 
rather than a point of focus.   
Despite my desire to be received as sincere, the tacit and explicit reception of 
my work as an act of performance tends to impose layers of symbolism and 
artifice upon my presence.  This is especially the case in moments of 
interactivity and dialogue.  In Stage Fright, Animals and Other Theatrical 
Problems, Nicholas Ridout has analysed what he calls ‘the unease of face-to-
face encounters between producer and consumers’ within performance (2006, 
p. 28).  In the book, Ridout argues that the actor’s ‘predicament’ during the act 
of performance is shaped by the experiential tension created by her dual 
status as living subject and object of consumption (2006, p. 38).  The  
‘predicament’ of the actor, in turn, creates ‘the predicament of audience’: the 
feeling of embarrassment (2006, p. 70-95).  According to Ridout, direct eye-
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contact with the performer can sometimes lead the spectator to experience 
shame, because it is during such moments that the reality of performance’s 
labour relations becomes apparent.  The actor’s gaze draws attention to the 
fact that the spectator is consuming her presence and subjectivity, casting 
light on the conditions of production that shape actor and audience relations in 
contemporary performance. Ridout notes: 
Modern theatrical spectatorship is a relationship to set up and to 
generate a particular set of pleasures, and it is in the confusion 
generated by action that departs from those that sustain this 
relationship, that the embarrassment occurs. (2006, p. 76-77)  
By rejecting the conventional relations that enable the audience’s  
consumption (for example, dimming the lights of the auditorium or setting up 
an imaginary fourth wall), direct address or eye-contact forces a self-
consciousness that undermines the audience’s capacity to sustain the 
suspension of disbelief necessary for enjoyment.   
My experience as both a producer and consumer of interactive theatre has 
provided me with many experiences of the unease described by Ridout.  I 
have argued in my own writing that interactive and immersive performance is 
often undermined by a sort of corporeal, self-alienation, in which the spectator 
is touched or looked at without understanding clearly her role in the 
performance, or her relationship to the performer (Edinborough 2016 p,127-
129).  Indeed, even in contexts where the spectator is conceptually clear 
about the producer’s expectations surrounding her participation in the 
performance, it is not always the case that she can accede in comfort to the 
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performers’ demands.  Recently, for example, I participated in a performance 
in which the dramaturgy framed me (without much prior warning) as a political 
prisoner - lining up to be shouted at by performers acting as angry Korean 
police officers.  The audience’s response to this circumstance was a mixture 
of polite standing, averted gazing and stifled giggling.  My experience of that 
particular moment was marked by feelings of mild embarrassment and a 
desire for the scene to finish, so that we could all move on.  
With such experiences and analysis in mind, the complexity of the performer’s 
task in interactive or immersive performance becomes clear.  Indeed, I would 
argue that the conventions Ridout exposes through his analysis of their 
subversion are so strong that even in performances that eschew dramatic 
representation, the performer faces difficulty in being received as sincere - 
because the spectator is always tacitly aware that to participate in dialogue 
with the performer is to be folded into the aesthetics of the performance, with 
the possible result of becoming an object of consumption herself.  So what 
modes of training exist to facilitate the performer’s successful self-
presentation as herself?  How should the performer train in order that she 
might be experienced as sincere during moments of spontaneous dialogue 
with the audience?  How might the performer help the audience resist the 
predicament that Ridout has associated with leaving the lights on (2006, p. 
70)?  
These questions emerged in my practice during the development of two 
pieces that I made in 2013 that integrated improvised conversations with the 
audience into the dramaturgy:  
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Punctum - an autobiographical solo performance that interwove 
stories about the death of my father with reflections on Roland Barthes’ 
Camera Lucida (1993) and an interview with an audience member.  
The piece was first presented at Hull Truck Theatre and later adapted 
for Resonance 104.4FM). 
The History of Water – a site-specific performance created for 
swimming audiences in two of Hull’s Edwardian swimming pools. The 
piece connected stories about the pool’s social history, with improvised 
conversations and swimming.  
As I think is often the case in the creation of interactive theatre, training was a 
subsidiary part of the process of making the piece – a process that was 
almost indistinguishable from the act of devising and rehearsal.  In this way, I 
would not claim to have outlined a specific process of training prior to the act 
of creating the pieces.  However, when I came to reflect on experiences of 
success and failure in ‘just being myself’, the mode of performance that I 
found myself connecting with echoed strongly with my experiences working 
with and researching the Stanislavskian tradition of acting.   
At first this connection seemed ironic.  Stanislavski’s approach is, in part, 
associated with the practice of manifesting a sort of public privacy during 
performance.   We can note, for example, that the fourth wall was 
conceptualised as a pragmatic means of overcoming the predicaments of fear 
and embarrassment later theorised by Ridout.  Indeed, Stanislavski’s 
suggested use of ‘circles of attention’ (2008, p. 98) can be read both as a tool 
of concentration and as a technique for avoiding the self-consciousness that 
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arises when we feel ourselves being watched.  These facts would suggest 
that Stanislavski’s approach would be of little value in the context of 
performances structured around conversations with the audience.  However, 
the connections made across my experiences of working with both interactive 
and Stanislavskian performance aesthetics, encouraged me to question 
whether it was possible to separate the idea of fourth wall from the 
proscenium.   
In experiencing moments of apparent sincere engagement with 
spectators/participants that echoed moments of participating in improvisations 
related to Stanislavski’s approach, I was encouraged to wonder if the 
performer could work to capture the spectator within a circle of attention.  I 
was encouraged to wonder if the fourth wall might be used to contain an 
audience member within a moment of theatricality, rather than being used to 
set him apart from scenic space and frame him as an observer.    
This idea is unconventional; however, it should be noted that Stanislavski’s 
aesthetics have been analysed in relation to theories of dialogic engagement.  
Dick McCaw has made connections between Stanislavski’s approach and the 
dialogical literary analysis of Mikhail Bakhtin, exploring the ways in which 
character is established in the spectator’s mediation of the relationship 
between text and actor through a process of ‘empathetic projection’ (McCaw 
2016, p. 127-146).  In parallel to McCaw’s analysis, I have argued that the 
spectator in Stanislavskian theatre acts as a co-creator of the characters 
presented onstage - responding affectively to the actor’s physical behaviour in 
order to build a sense of her emotions and internal world (Edinborough 2016, 
p. 59-78).  Indeed, in my analysis, I argued that Stanislavski’s demand for the 
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actor to live truthfully on stage is less a philosophical idea, than a practical 
attempt to facilitate the spectator’s affective response to the actor’s body 
(2016, p. 65).  This argument is based on the fact that there are fewer 
cognitive or perceptual obstacles to empathising with a seemingly real 
situation than a seemingly artificial one.   
Stanislavski claimed that the actor gave ‘life physical embodiment in an 
aesthetic, theatrical form’ (2008, p. 36).  The fourth wall is most often 
understood as the device used to facilitate the spectator’s empathetic and 
affective identification with the reality of the actor’s material presence on stage 
- acting as a sort of one-way glass that enables this act of voyeuristic 
consumption.  However, this analysis doesn’t explain how this imaginary wall 
is constructed in the first place.  It is easy to argue that the presence of the 
proscenium arch and the dimming of the auditorium lights are the most 
commonly used tools for setting up the boundary between theatre space and 
scenic space; but this does not account for how the fourth wall is experienced 
in processes of rehearsal, or in traverse or in-the-round performance.  The 
scenographic account of the fourth wall also undermines the agency and 
importance of the actor, suggesting that the actor’s work simply happens in 
isolation from pre-existing conventions of spectatorship.  Careful reading of 
Stanislavski’s accounts of his process suggest that it is the actor’s ability to 
live truthfully in the given circumstances of the play that create the true 
stability of the fourth wall.  On reading about the practices associated with 
‘given circumstances’ in An Actor’s Work (2008, p. 37-59), it seems clear that 
Stanislavski believes the actor’s ability to become unselfconsciously 
consumed by a task to be the means by which the spectator can begin to 
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identify with her actions.   It is the perceived reality of the actor’s concentrated 
behaviour that ultimately allows for the co-creation of the boundary between 
stage and auditorium.   
By conceptualising the fourth wall as a mutually created phenomenon, rather 
than a scenographic imposition or convention, it becomes clearer how we 
might find ways to appropriate its use in interactive or immersive contexts.  
Indeed, on developing this understanding, I was able to see that one way of 
training to be myself in performance, and thus, perhaps, encouraging the 
audience to recognise their own potential for sincerity during a performance, 
was to think about the process of living truthfully in the non-representational 
given circumstances of the performances I was making.  My thinking was that 
if I could live truthfully in conversations with the spectators/participants, they 
would be less inclined to think or worry about the artifice of our situation.  The 
fourth wall would thus become a surrounding container for our shared 
attention, rather than a window into another world.  
Concepts of truth and authenticity are, of course, extremely problematic in 
performance.  And the monological truth we might associate with 
Stanislavski’s rationalist thinking has also come under attack in the post-war 
period.  However, I believe that the best way of thinking about the idea of truth 
in Stanislavski’s approach is through the interrogation of self-experience.  In 
other words, it can be described as a feeling found in unselfconscious doing – 
a form of tacit knowledge.  Perhaps the best example in Stanislavski’s own 
descriptions of his approach comes from An Actor’s Work when Kostya 
describes his peer Marya performing an exercise with the teacher, Tortsov.  In 
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the account, Kostya recalls Marya waiting patiently to start while Tortsov looks 
for a note in his diary (Stanislavski 2008, p. 39-40): 
…Marya gradually settled down and finally stopped moving completely, 
fixing her gaze attentively on Tortsov.  She was afraid of disturbing him 
and patiently waited for further instructions from her teacher.  Her pose 
became natural.  
Eventually, Tortsov brings the exercise to a close only for Marya to ask: 
‘Were we acting then? ...I thought I was just sitting and waiting until you 
found what you wanted in your notebook and told me what you wanted 
me to do.  I didn’t act at all.’ 
Tortsov replies: 
‘That’s just what was good about it, that you were sitting there for a 
reason and weren’t playacting.’  
The reality or truth of Marya’s performance in this context is literal.  She didn’t 
even know she was acting.  Tortsov created a circumstance in which the actor 
could commit to the act of waiting without any artifice.  Of course, the problem 
that we might point out in relation to Marya’s performance is that one can only 
play this sort of trick once.  The difficulty for the student of Stanislavski (or 
Tortsov) is that she is required to know that she was acting, while 
simultaneously not letting that fact impact upon her ability to live 
spontaneously within the fiction of a play’s given circumstances.  
To relate this to the experience of taking part in spontaneous conversations 
within my own work, I can note that while it was imperative for me to have 
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genuine conversations with my audience, providing moments of sincere 
communication, I also had to work carefully to time and guide the 
conversations to end in an appropriate place, ready for the next section/scene 
of the performance.  In The History of Water this guiding was both thematic 
and spatial.  I had to make it feel like we were just swimming and chatting, 
while bringing them to specific parts in the pool – capturing the 
spectator/participants in a bubble of sincerity by committing fully (and yet 
lightly) to the moment at hand.  In order to do this, I tried to project my own 
lack of self-consciousness onto the people whom I was talking with in order 
that I might resist the self-consciousness or embarrassment that Ridout 
described. All of which is easier said than done.  Consistently finding the 
feeling of not play-acting that Tortsov praised in Marya’s performance of 
waiting required some practice. 
Performance Training and Relational Aesthetics 
While I hope that my reasons for appropriating Stanislavski’s aesthetics and 
training within my work are becoming clear, I am also concerned that I am 
describing a very specific context, created with reference to some very 
personal artistic aims.  I wouldn’t blame anyone for asking why it matters that I 
drew on Stanislavski’s thinking to develop the mode of performance for two 
little-publicised pieces.  It is for this reason that I think it worth returning to the 
macroscopic strand of my analysis.    
I have noted that one of the ways in which we might successfully make links 
between historically distanced techniques and contemporary practice is to 
recognise the importance of self-enquiry in the process of performance 
	 18	
training.  For example, we can consider truth or authenticity in Stanislavski’s 
work as heuristics, rather than clearly articulated, abstract concepts1.  
Through this shift in understanding, exercises can be reframed as devices to 
investigate states and feelings, as well as routes towards predetermined 
skills.  Such a change in perception does more than simply provide a way to 
uncouple training methods from their original aesthetic contexts.  Prioritizing 
training as an end rather than a means can also be understood to highlight 
performance’s status as an event or phenomenon rather than a fixed object of 
reflection/appreciation.  Conceptualising training as an open-ended, heuristic 
process, creates a pragmatic space for the performers to consider states of 
being during the act of performance.  This in turn opens up room to explore 
the ways in which the performance event establishes experiential contexts for 
both performer and spectator.  Indeed, through reflecting on the development 
of training for both Punctum and The History of Water, I have realised that I 
only began to fully recognise the potential value of Stanislavski’s thinking for 
my work when I began to consider the kinds of experiential relationships I 
wanted to establish with the audience in my work.   
In the opening section of this article, I described some of the problems with 
establishing clear definitions of form and discipline in contemporary 
performance and contemporary performance training, noting that it is not 
always clear what to include within the content of training. However, thinking 
about the possible use of Stanislavskian approaches within immersive and 
interactive performance has encouraged me to recognise that such problems 																																																								1	Although I would argue that the rigour of Stanislavski’s conceptual discussion of artistic truth 
deserves more credit than he is often given in critiques of his system. 	
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might be overcome by analysing performance training with specific reference 
to the understanding of performance as a phenomenal and relational context.   
This view is informed by my reading of the paradigm of artistic practice 
described by Nicholas Bourriaud in his influential work, Relational Aesthetics 
(2002).  The book argues that the key to understanding much contemporary 
art lies in recognising it as means of establishing and facilitating relationships.  
In a move that echoes Victor Turner’s anthropological theory of performance 
as a form of threshold experience (1985), Bourriaud’s articulation of relational 
aesthetics frames art as a structure, existing in time and/or space, that 
destabilizes habitual practices of social engagement.  
In asserting this idea, Bourriaud also establishes a highly specific account of 
artistic form: 
Form is most often defined as an outline contrasting with a content.   
But modernist aesthetics talks about ‘formal beauty’ by referring to a 
sort of (con)fusion between style and content, and an inventive 
compatibility of the former with the latter.  The most common criticism 
to do with new artistic practices consists, moreover, in denying them 
any ‘formal effectiveness’, or in singling out their shortcomings in 
‘formal resolution’. In observing contemporary artistic practices, we 
ought to talk about ‘formations’ rather than ‘forms’.  Unlike an object 
that is closed in on itself by the intervention of a style and a signature, 
present-day art shows that form only exists in the encounter and in the 
dynamic relationship enjoyed by an artistic proposition with other 
formations, artistic or otherwise. (2002, p. 21) 
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This assessment of form as means of mediation is particularly useful in 
addressing the problem of disciplinary indiscipline in contemporary 
performance, because it allows for us to sidestep the kinds of problems that 
emerge when attempting to define, as Abramović did, the form of one 
discipline in opposition to another (O’Hagan 2010).  Through considering the 
artwork as a way to open up ‘social interstices’ (Bourriaud 2002, p. 14-18), 
rather than the sum of certain, identifiable material qualities, Bourriaud’s 
analysis allows for abstract notions of a performance’s reality or artifice to be 
pared away from our discussion of the event.  Instead of conceptualising the 
work of art as a permanent object, or futilely attempting to trap it within porous 
disciplinary boundaries, the idea of relational aesthetics situates the work of 
art (or the act of performance) in the dialogue between producer and 
consumer.   This means that notions of fakeness or reality need not be 
understood as inherent in the work of art, or the mode of practice; they can, 
instead, be understood as emergent qualities in the relationship between 
performer and spectator/participant.   Training can be assessed in relation to 
required qualities of formation, rather than looking at them as paths to 
achieving the techniques necessary for fulfilling a form. 
While this might seem like a subtle distinction, its value is significant for those 
of us attempting to establish connections between historical and 
contemporary approaches to training for performance. Abramović’s stated 
hatred of theatre may not bear close analysis, but her words do provide an 
insight into the qualities she holds dear in her work.  Indeed, considering the 
enormous popularity of her residency at MOMA, as well as her status as the 
so-called ‘queen of performance art’ (Wescott 2010), it strikes me that the 
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binary she describes can be understood to helpfully encapsulate the aesthetic 
preoccupations of a flourishing branch of art that is deeply concerned with the 
ways in which performance might be used to facilitate moments of authentic 
experience.  However, through recognising that the reality or authenticity of a 
performance is a perceived quality, manifested in dialogue with the audience, 
it becomes possible to make rational connections across disciplines and 
history.  
With reference to my own interest in both the work of Stanislavski and 
Abramović, I can state that I have an intuitive sense that Abramović’s practice 
of reality is intimately connected to Stanislavski’s demand for the actor to live 
truthfully on stage.  I would argue that although there are significant 
differences in the frames that they used to create relationships with 
spectators, the social interstices they were interested in opening up share 
similar values. Such a claim probably deserves and requires further 
unpacking; however, I am less interested here in proving the potential 
connections between realist theatre and performance art than I am in 
suggesting that contemporary performance-makers can benefit from 
evaluating processes and contents of training with reference to the desired 
relationships between consumer and producer.  Such an approach makes the 
process of selecting training material a relatively simple affair, because 
instead of becoming locked within (often falsely defined) disciplinary 
boundaries, makers of contemporary performance can, instead, concentrate 
on the qualities of engagement and experience they want their work to 
facilitate.    
Finding Formations and Adapting Exercises  
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The qualities of engagement and experience that I was interested in exploring 
in my conversation-based performances are perhaps best captured by terms 
such as openness and sincerity.  Indeed, as I have discussed, I was 
interested in developing a quality of openness that would alleviate the tension 
that participants sometimes feel within intimate and interactive theatre.  To put 
this in terms that can be connected to Bourriaud’s analysis, I was interested in 
creating structures of interaction that provided opportunities for sincere 
conversation about specific topics.  In Punctum, for example, I interviewed an 
audience member about their relationship with their father, while in The 
History of Water, my co-performers and I discussed experiences of swimming 
and bathing in public baths with the audience/participants. 
The technical difficulty that emerged when entering into such conversations 
was found in establishing a balance between spontaneity and genuine 
conversation while maintaining a grasp on the thematic and structural 
elements of the performances.  I attempted to solve this difficulty by 
connecting my process to Stanislavski’s demand for the actor to live truthfully 
on stage - establishing the themes and dramaturgical structures of each piece 
as a set of given circumstances to live through.  However, in terms of 
selecting training exercises that might facilitate my preparation for the 
performances, I found Stanislavski’s (understandable) practical emphasis on 
text and narrative to be problematic.  While Stanislavski’s aesthetics inspired 
me to think about a possible formation for establishing sincere relationships 
with the audience/participants, my practical engagement with the task of 
adapting Stanislavski’s aesthetics was ultimately guided by exercises 
developed by Sanford Meisner and Lee Strasberg.   
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This shift in influence is, in part, related to the emphasis on truthful behaviour 
within the work of Stanislavski’s American devotees.  Perhaps one of the key 
differences between the teachings of Stanislavski and the teachings Meisner 
and Strasberg is a transition in focus from the play-text to the actor as the 
centre of the performance.  While this claim is difficult to evidence in concrete 
terms, it is my always my feeling when reading Meisner or Strasberg that 
theatre starts with the actor rather than the play.  This is, I believe, in direct 
opposition to Stanislavski, whose interest in the actor’s creativity was always 
intimately linked to his desire to illuminate the ‘inner life of the character and 
of the whole play (Stanislavski 2008, p. 19).  I find this shift in aesthetic focus 
to be helpful for the non-diegetic and non-representational context of my work.  
Meisner’s adage that ‘the foundation of acting is the reality of doing’ (1987, p. 
16) makes the distance between the given circumstances of a play and the 
given circumstances of a non-representational performance score very small 
indeed.  Thinking about his training as a way to engage spontaneously in the 
process of ‘doing’, allowed for me to find ways of training for entering into a 
relationship as myself in such a way that I hoped the audience would find it 
almost possible to perceive or attend to the further aesthetic layers of our 
conversations.  
In Theatrical Reality, I analysed Meisner’s work with repetition as a means of 
exploring and sensitising the actor to the qualities of the present moment 
(Edinborough 2016, p. 75-76).  Repetition starts with one actor making an 
observation about her partner, saying it out loud (‘You have green eyes’), and 
having their partner repeat it (‘I have green eyes’).  These words are repeated 
again and again as a sort of ‘ping pong game’ (Meisner 1987, p. 22).  The 
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exercise promotes an engaged quality of listening, inviting the performer to 
respond spontaneously and un-intellectually to her partner’s behaviour, 
forming ‘the basis of what eventually becomes an emotional dialogue’ 
(Meisner 1987, p. 22) that gives form to the temporal liveness of performance.    
Perhaps most relevant to the discussion of non-representational, interactive 
and immersive performance is the way in which the exercise requests the 
performer to live unselfconsciously in the moment of dialogue – starting with 
the premise that the best way to be truthful is to work from a place of 
impulsive response. Indeed, it was the use of Meisner’s repetition exercise 
during rehearsal that helped to develop my ability to create a space of 
openness that I could share with my audience/participants.  The exercise 
encourages one to practise and understand the feeling of entering into 
dialogue.  Through exploring this feeling in training, I became more able to 
replicate or re-find that state of engagement found within the conversations I 
had with spectators/participants.  And in the process of connecting with this 
state during the interactive and immersive contexts of my performance, I 
found that a clearer sense of my co-presence with the spectator, a co-
presence that, I believe, contained their attention in such a way as to limit 
their self-consciousness - extending the fourth wall to encompass our 
relationship.  
I am, of course, describing particular moments of success.  However, these 
moments can be evidenced with reference to audience feedback from The 
History of Water, which expressed the ‘humanity’ of the event.  One audience 
member wrote that she felt as though she had had a massage after the 
performance; another expressed impressed confusion about how she had 
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been guided around the pool ‘as if [she was] being pulled by a magnet’ 
(Anonymous 2013). 
Beyond Meisner’s training, another, simpler, adapted application of the 
Method was found in the use of affective memory - particularly as described 
by Lee Strasberg in A Dream of Passion (1987, p.111).  My engagement with 
affective memory was very basic.  I simply reflected on the sensations and 
feelings I associated with memories of open and intimate conversations.  This 
process of reflection allowed me to establish experiential connections 
between my sense memory and the process of talking with the audience.  
This was particularly useful in the context of Punctum, where I was required to 
talk with a guest or volunteer in front of the rest of the audience.   By actively 
connecting the process of discussion with heuristic sensory reference points, I 
became better able to maintain a certain physical state in the conversation, 
rooting myself in a specific quality of interaction.  Interestingly, with regard to 
my discussion of a containing fourth wall, I eventually felt myself becoming 
more adept at directing this feeling towards my guest, in the best examples, 
creating a sense of intimacy within the more widely shared space of the 
auditorium.  While this is, again, difficult to evidence rigorously, I was 
interested to note that after the show both guests and audiences expressed 
surprise about the feeling of intimacy and the experiences the guests were 
happy to share with the rest of the audience.   
Micro-Conclusions 
In both Punctum and The History of Water, I attempted to use my experiences 
with Meisner’s and Strasberg’s techniques as heuristic devices for negotiating 
	 26	
the tension between spontaneous conversation and a pre-determined 
performance structure.  I used their techniques to find ways of feeling like 
myself in the multi-layered context of performance.  This appropriation of 
Stanislavskian training techniques was enabled by the recognition of the 
centrality of interpersonal relationships within the performances.  By 
considering my training as a means to reflect on qualities of sensation and 
self-experience during the conversations I had during the performances, it 
became possible to connect Stanislavskian aesthetics to contemporary 
relational forms.  There is a significant distance between the Stanislavskian 
tradition of theatre and the field of non-representational, non-diegetic 
performance; however, by recognising that both seek to build affective 
relationships between performer and spectator, I found myself able to forge 
experiential paths between them.   
Macro-Conclusions 
It is worth noting that the once vital training of the post-war period has been 
cast adrift from much of contemporary performance practice.  Once upon a 
time, every drama student in the academy would have been introduced to the 
training of Grotowski, Brook and Lecoq. Now, it seems we are in a situation 
where courses related to training are being replaced by those with a focus on 
theatre-making - where blurred disciplinary boundaries make it difficult to 
define the content of training or its distinction from rehearsal or devising.  I 
don’t think you would have to look very far to find a theatre-maker, scholar or 
post-graduate student who thought Grotowski, Brook or Lecoq to be rather 
old-fashioned.  However, through understanding that all forms of training 
provide reflective experiences for the performer, we can begin to find ways to 
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revive training practices for use in contemporary performance practices that 
reject historical disciplinary boundaries.   By avoiding categorizations that 
reference form or style, the experiential training methods promoted by 
practitioners from the avant garde of the 1960s and 1970s can be usefully 
reincorporated into discussions of contemporary performance.    
Grotowski, who interestingly thought of himself as a logical heir to 
Stanislavski’s legacy, chose to leave behind the theatre of productions in the 
late 1960s.  For a long time this choice has been discussed as a move 
towards spiritualism and away from performance.  However, the paradigm of 
relational aesthetics can be used to re-elevate figures like Grotowski  to 
prominence in discussions of contemporary practice.  One might argue that 
theatre-makers like Grotowski (or Barba or Chaikin or even Stanislavski) 
replaced form with formation well before the advent of 1990s art, emphasizing 
performance as both a relational event and a mode of enquiry far in advance 
of the contemporary practitioners we cast as innovators in this area of 
practice.  Perhaps it is time we recognized that performance training is not 
dead or out of date, it has just been waiting for contemporary practice and 
aesthetics to catch up to some of its insights.   
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